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IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE THEORY AND NUCLEAR STABILITY
SUMMARY
This study has two purposes First, it attempts to explain why the Western 
nuclear states pursue divergent and partially competing deterrence policies 
Differences will be shown to/ derive principally from differential perceptions by 
American, trench, and British policy-makers of external threats (including those 
posed by the nuclear systems of alliance partners), dissimilar technological and 
economic resource constraints and, most critically, the varying domestic political 
divisions within each state and its responses to the imperatives of alliance 
cohesion
Second the study will try to identify the implications of differential nuclear 
policies for the maintenance of nuclear stability
CURRENT STATE OF DETERRENCE THEORY
The model currently used to explain nuclear deterrence is derived largely from 
the work of such seminal theorists of the 1950s and 19b0s as Thomas Schelling (I960 
196b), Herman Kahn (i960, 1965), William Kaufmann (1954), Bernard Brodie (1946,
1959) Glenn H Snyder (1961), et al Despite variations in emphasis (and at the 
risk of simplification),! they may be said to share four principal assumptions about 
deterrence behavior First, the state is perceived as a unitary actor, seeking, 
through the manipulation of nuclear threats, to maximize security as a dominant 
value Second, nations pursuing nuclear deterrent policies are perceived as 
following similar, prescubed strategies Third, changes m  a state's deterrence 
policy is viewed as externally determined, the result of anticipated reactions to the 
behavior of its opponent Fourth, the domestic policy-making process for deterrenc 
is conceived as a "black box" from which similar patterns of deterrence behavior 
emerge regardless of regime, national differences or divisions within the society
First-wave theorists formulated their analyses in terms of responses to three 
central questions or imperatives First, what are the threats to a state s security9 
Second, what kind of strategic doctrine weapon systems, and force levels best 
respond to these threats9 And, third, what arms control policies best complement Lhe 
state's strategic doctrine and military posture9 Responses to these questions 
constitute the key components of a state's deterrence strategy
Figure i outlines the causal relations implied in first-wave thinking Threat 
perceptions, doctrinal and weapons responses, and arms control strategies are 
pictured as the products of logically ordered cognitive processes The object of
 ^ The approach of first-wave thinkers has considerably more power than can be 
described here That the theoretical approach first sketched by analysts like 
bchellmg is still a very powerful tool is suggested by the work of Brams et al 
(e g Brams, 1985)
Figure 1 UNITARY ACTOR PARADIGM
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each decision is the maxmization of national security values Other values arc 
subordinated to the security imperative Nuclear policy is adversary driven and the 
resulting nuclear balance between them tends toward equi Librium if the opponents 
cooperate If not, tne stage is set for a potentially destabilizing arras race or 
war
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FIRST-WAVE THEORY
Over the past several years, a growing body of literature has raised serious 
tncoretical and empirical problems (not to mention moral questions) about first-wave 
thinking First, the United States, France, and Great Britain do not conform to a 
unitary actor model (Allison, 1971, Scheinman, 1965, and Freedman, 1981 ) Second 
the nuclear strategies of the Western nuclear states diverge on key elements of 
deterrence (Kolodziej 1985 ) Third, the deterrence behavior of the Western 
nuclear states can only be partially attributable to adversary moves and messages 
(Neustadt, 1970 and George and Smoke, 1974 ) Fourth, conflict between adversaries is 
partially a domestic phenomenon (Lebow, 1981, Jervis, 1985)
Figure 2 presents an alternative understanding of the causal relationships that 
explain a state's deterrent policy as a function of its response to the three 
imperatives outlined in Figure 1 It identifies key variables which potentially 
provide a more accurate explanation of the determinants of the nuclear policies of 
the Western democracies than first-wave analysis It not only includes the notion of 
the reciprocal impact of adversary behavior but also (1) the decision-making 
processes of the antagonists (2) the perceptual, valuational, and cognitive biases 
of the opponents that affect their interpretation of adversary behavior, and (J) the 
economic, technological, and political constraints under which decision-makers must 
operate within a state
Figure 2 presents a coalitional paradigm of deterrence It assumes a 
non-unitary actor with heterogeneous and often inconsistent values —  security being 
only one of several important goals that are pursued at any one time Decisions are 
made through a political process characterized by competing coalitions of individuals 
and groups within and outside the government B lrgaming and negotiation, not 
command decisions, are central features of governmental decision-making
Coalitional competition among multiple domestic actors impacts simultaneously 
not sequentially, on tne three sub-domains of deterrence Decision flowing trom each 
realm must be coordinated and compromised to approximate a coherent deterrent 
posture Decisions made by one policy sub-community about threats, for example are 
not necessarily linked to weapons or arms control accords initially defined by other 
sub-groups The membership of these coalitions overlap, but are not congruent
In Figure 2 the policy positions of the coalitions operating in the three 
sub-domains of deterrence overlap only at A Intersections also occur between two of 
the sub-domains at B, C, and D leaving the third sub-domain with no input into the 
decisions flowing from the other regions Large areas of the policy formation 
process within each sub-domain are as depicted, non-intersecting These areas are 
insulated from the other deterrence sub-domains although the decisions made within 
each sector are mutually interdependent
Figure 2 also suggests how groups and rival coalitions, forming with the 
specific sub-domains of deterrence seek to control the state's decision within these
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Figure 2 NON UNITARY ACTOR PARADIGM
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areas These sub-domains are drawn as spheres to suggest independent centers ot 
decision Groups within these spheres compete for polilical support and tor resources 
to define the state's nuclear deterrence policies While their actions may be 
initially guided by the same perceptions of external threat (Jams, 1982) ligure 2 
suggests that later responses are increasingly influenced by unique domestic 
political demands and shaped by resource limitations The initial reaction to 
perceived external threats creates a growing number and variety ot conflicting groups 
within a state with a stake in their particular conception ot the threat (the 
military otficer corps, scientists and engineers, pressure groups, parties, 
bureaucratic and governmental elites)
As the deterrence policy process becomes domesticated and diffused throughout 
the internal governmental process, the influence of the policy process itself and the 
influence of the competing groups within it help explain what otherwise appear to be 
gaps and inconsistencies in a state's deterrence posture From a cognitive or 
unitary actor perspective, the latter may appear illogical, risky, costly, and 
de-stabilizing, from the viewpoint of internal political pressures, it may appear to 
be an understandable and even sensible adjustment to domestic imperatives or 
responses to economic and technological constraints and opportunities
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A COALIIIUNAL PARADIGM 
FOR WESTERN DETERRENCE SYSTEMS
A coalitional conception of nuclear policy-making, has several sets ot policy 
implications Three will merit special attention First, the management and 
promotion of stable deterrence implies the harmonization of three competing 
imperatives domestic politics alliance cohesion and the differential security 
needs of each Western nuclear state vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as the principal 
adversary Deterrence assumes as much the character of an ongoing internal political 
and external diplomatic bargaining process as a strategic dialectic between only two 
adversaries, as it has often been depicted by many first-wave strategic analysts
Second, deterrence hinges critically on the stability of the domestic politics 
of nuclear states and on the finely spun internal political arrangements that have 
been precariously stitched together by ruling coalitions within these states to guide 
the strategies governing their nuclear weapons
Third deterrence must be conceived m  multilateral, not bilateral, terms 
Neither the Western democracies nor the Soviet Union can be indifferent to the 
policies pursued by each other
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY A^D APPROACH
The study will be provisionally organized as follows Chapter one will 
summarize the current state ot deterrence theory and present an alternative paradigm 
by which deterrence behavior can be understood Chapters two, three, and four will 
trace, respectively, American, French, and British nuclear policies to demonstrate 
the applicability of the paradigm sketched in Figure 2 Examined will be the 
evolving conceptions of threat, doctrinal and weapons responses, and arms control 
strategies pursued by each state These policies will be related to the domestic 
coalitions within each state that reflect opposing tendencies with respect to these
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three levels of analysis Chapter five will identify the threats to nuclear 
stability arising from the divergent deterrence policies pursued by the Western 
nuclear states within the Atlantic alliance and between the East—West blocs A final 
chapter will suggest ways to enhance alliance cohesion, to improve the management of 
the East-West nuclear balance, and to promote the conditions for detente
The analysis will be largely based on a review of the abundant primary and 
secondary literature covering the Western nuclear systems Since emphasis will be 
placed on current behavior and problems, my analysis will be supplemented by 
interviews with relevant decision-makers and analysts in the respective countries
SCHEDULE OF RESEARCH
This project will require approximately two years to complete if I can be 
adequately supported, freeing me from other academic responsibilities It will take 
longer if funding is only partially available I expect to spend one year m  
Washington D C and another in Europe, divided equally between the United Kingdom and 
France
In London, I expect to have access to Chatham House In France, I expect to be 
associated again with the Institut Français des Relations Internationales where I 
stayed m  1977-78 and again in 1983 while completing my most recent manuscript on 
French arms production and transfer policy
With respect to this proposed study, I have already had several papers accepted 
tor publication, including parts of my manuscript on French arms policy, an 
evaluation of U S deterrence practices since the signing of SALT I (Kolodziej,
1983), and an analysis of European reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(Kolodziej, 198b) I will also contribute an article on the implications of the 
British and French nuclear systems as part of an arms control impact statement 
project sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (S1PRI) 1 
have reviewed the theor^Lical deterrence literature m  a seminar on deterrence theory 
that 1 conducted m  fall 1984 Currently, I will be teaching a seminar in 
international relations theory as a complement to my work on deterrence theory
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